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Abstract. Symbolic encryption, in the style of Dolev-Yao models, is
ubiquitous in formal security models. In its common use, encryption on
a whole message is speciﬁed as a single monolithic block. From a crypto-
graphic perspective, however, this may require a resource-intensive cryp-
tographic algorithm, namely an authenticated encryption scheme that
is secure under chosen ciphertext attack. Therefore, many reasonable
encryption schemes, such as AES in the CBC or CFB mode1, are not
among the implementation options.
In this paper, we report new attacks on CBC and CFB based imple-
mentations of the well-known Needham-Schroeder and Denning-Sacco
protocols. To avoid such problems, we advocate the use of reﬁned no-
tions of symbolic encryption that have natural correspondence to stan-
dard cryptographic encryption schemes.
Keywords: Encryption, Assumptions, Implementation.
1 Introduction
A private-key encryption scheme enables two honest parties that share a key
to privately communicate over a network, in such a way that a dishonest man-
in-middle, the adversary, is unable to gain any non-trivial information about
the communication. The requirements of cryptographic encryption may include
left-right indistinguishability (IND) and non-malleability (NM), which can be
characterized in diﬀerent attack settings [2].
Over the years, many abstractions of cryptographic encryption have been pro-
posed. The most popular abstraction is the Dolev-Yao model [3]. In this sym-
bolic model, two types of simpliﬁcations are introduced. Firstly, binary strings
and functions are replaced by symbolic terms and derivation rules. In particular,
this results in idealized encryption functions—either an adversary can decrypt
a symbolic ciphertext (e.g., if he can derive the key) or the adversary gets ab-
solutely no information about the plaintext. The second simpliﬁcation is related
to the capabilities of an adversary, namely the adversary is modelled as a non-
deterministic strategy that is limited to selecting its actions from a small set of
1 i.e., cipher block chaining (CBC) and cipher feedback mode of encryption (CFB) [1].
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(pre-deﬁned) logic rules. The security models that use these two abstractions are
commonly referred to as symbolic/formal security models.
A symbolic model is simpler than its cryptographic counterpart, and therefore
one can avoid relatively complicated and long proofs of traditional cryptography.
More importantly, computers can do the tedious job of proving (and similarly
verifying) the proofs of security.
Unfortunately, any security assurance in a symbolic model does not automat-
ically translate to the underlying computational cryptography and, therefore,
to its hardware/software implementation. In any implementation of symbolic
encryption, a system designer has to make certain security critical decisions, re-
lated to, e.g., mode of encryption, block alignment, and message authentication
code. Many attacks targeting the implementation of encryption are known [4, 5].
One approach to address such issues is to always rely on the most stringent
interpretation of encryption [2], i.e., an encryption scheme that is private and
non-malleable against an adversary that has adaptive access to encryption and
decryption oracles. Such strong requirements, however, often implies a resource-
intensive implementation.
We note that encryption or decryption oracles are not present in many pro-
tocols. Moreover, the security of a protocol does not always depend on non-
malleability or privacy of the encryption. Therefore, in our view, one should use
symbolic encryption in such a way that it closely mimics an actual cryptographic
encryption scheme. In this way, not only one can avoid many implementation
related ambiguities but also a level of safe optimization can be achieved, e.g., if
a protocol is secure with ECB based encryption.
Our contributions in this paper are summarized in the following.
We present new attacks on the CBC and CFB based implementations of the
Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key (NSSK) protocol [6], without exploiting the
previously known vulnerability [7]. These attacks also work with the seven-round
version of the NSSK protocol [8], which is an improved version of the original
NSSK protocol after the ﬂaw [7] was discovered. Further, we report new attacks
on CBC and CFB based implementations of the Denning-Sacco symmetric-key
(DSSK) protocol [7], which is another improved version of the NSSK protocol,
and which does not suﬀer any attacks to the best of our knowledge.
It is worth mentioning that the CBC mode is semantically secure in traditional
CPA (chosen plaintext attack) model [9], and the CFB mode is secure against an
even more powerful adversary who has an access to block-wise online encryption
oracle [10]. Our attacks, although are CPAs, are against the protocol security
and not against the CBC/CFB security, which indicates that these protocols
entail more stringent requirements on encryption, such as non-malleability.
Further, we advocate a few reﬁned ways of using symbolic encryption that
have natural correspondence to standard cryptographic constructions. The re-
ﬁned notions require diﬀerent implementation resources and, therefore, a level
of safe optimization can be achieved while still relying on symbolic encryption.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In Sect. 2, we brieﬂy examine the
prior art. Next, in Sect. 3 and Sect. 4, we present the new attacks. In Sect. 5,
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we list down a few symbolic encryption schemes and show that these schemes
provide diﬀerent levels of security in a symbolic model. In Sect. 7, we discuss
our contribution in a broader perspective, and in Sect. 8 we conclude our work.
In the paper, exclusive-or (⊕) is abbreviated as Xor and a distinction should be
observed between symbolic encryption [11, 12] and cryptographic encryption [2,
13].
2 Related Work
Meadows [14] presents an extensive survey of the works that rely on symbolic
encryption. We here do not discuss formal security analysis as such and only
focus on the implementation perspective of symbolic encryption.
Moore [15] was probably the ﬁrst to highlight the security problems that may
occur in implementing symbolic encryption. Boyd [16] describes a few possible
attacks on the NSSK protocol based on some strong assumptions such as the
use of a stream cipher for encryption, however, the presentation does not come
close to that of ours. Mao and Boyd [17] discuss some general vulnerabilities that
may occur when using cipher-block-chaining mode for implementing encryption.
Bellovin [4] reported vulnerabilities in the earlier versions of IPsec by exploiting
CBC-mode encryption.
Stubblebine et al. [18] investigates modes of encryption for discovering known
pairs and chosen texts, using the NRL Protocol Analyzer. Our attack makes use
of chosen texts, in which a party can be used as an encryption oracle; this is
then exploited by an adversary who obtains the ciphertext against a plaintext. In
the same line of work, Kremer and Ryan [19] model ECB and CBC mode using
Blanchet’s protocol veriﬁer. Interestingly, they use the NSSK protocol as a case
study but stop after indicating the existence of chosen texts in the protocol.
Nevertheless, the existence of chosen texts is quite common in cryptographic
protocols and often does not lead to insecure encryption.
An interesting case is that of encryption-only-mode of IPsec, for which Pa-
terson and Yau [5] exploited CBC mode of encryption. Their attacks work if
an implementation does not follow the standard strictly. Later, Degabriele and
Paterson [20] published another attack that works only if an implementation
strictly follows the standard.
Chevalier et al. [21] extend the Dolev-Yao intruder with the capability to
exploit Xor operator, as used in CBC, and they show that the protocol insecurity
problem is NP-complete. Ku¨sters and Truderung developed a veriﬁcation method
that can reduce the protocol models that are Xor-linear to Xor free models,
which then can be analysed using existing tools [22]; however, the CBC based
NSSK protocol is not Xor-linear due to the nested encryption.
In our view, the multiplicity error of DSSK protocol [23] is not a valid attack
because it does not violate the claimed goals [7], namely neither conﬁdentiality of
the session key nor the entity authentication of participants is violated. Similarly,
a reported type ﬂaw [24] is based on a somewhat dubious assumption: if {T } ≡
{T, {B,KAB, T }SA}. Even if this assumption holds, the session key remains
conﬁdential and there is no violation of authentication.
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In a slightly bigger picture, an impressive amount of research has been done
for establishing a theoretically sound link between symbolic cryptography and
complexity-theoretic cryptography [25–27]. In the line of universal composabil-
ity, Ran Canetti and Herzog [28] show that the Dolev-Yao model can be layered
on top of the traditional universal composability framework. Currently, this ap-
proach is limited to so-called simple protocols: the protocols that use only those
cryptographic schemes that have some standard symbolic counterparts.
Another related line of work is on the security of online ciphers started by Bel-
lare et al. [29]. In an online cipher, encryption of a plaintext block only depends
on the current block and the previous blocks of the plaintext. Note that the
requirements of a cipher are more stringent than an encryption scheme, because
one is not allowed to use random initializing vectors (iv) in the construction
of a cipher. Without a random iv, CBC and CFB modes are the candidates of
online cipher, for which Fouque et al. [10] show that the CFB mode is provably
secure and the CBC mode is not secure. The CBC mode is provably secure with
a randomly chosen iv [9].
The attacks presented in this paper are based on the actual construction of
CBC and CFB modes (using random IVs), but we still use symbolic abstraction
to model the underlying cipher. We believe this level of abstraction is a good
compromise between computational cryptography (where a cipher is modelled
as a pseudorandom permutation) and symbolic cryptography (where the whole
encryption scheme is modelled as a perfect cipher). At this abstraction level,
which probably has not been explored in the prior art, we present a few symbolic
encryption schemes.
3 NSSK Protocol
The NSSK protocol [6] is a key establishment protocol, based on symmetric
encryption and the notion of a trusted third-party (TTP). In this paper, we
assume that when a session expires then the session key is safely discarded,
because this assumption prohibits the previously known ﬂaw [7] resulting in a
“secure” NSSK protocol. The protocol narrations are listed in the following.
(1) A −→ S : A,B,NA
(2) S −→ A : {NA, B,KAB, {KAB, A}SB}SA
(3) A −→ B : {KAB, A}SB
(4) B −→ A : {NB}AB
(5) A −→ B : {NB − 1}AB
Here A and B represent the initiator and responder roles that parties can take
during an execution of the protocol; S is the role of a trusted third-party (TTP).
It is assumed that S knows the identities of all legitimate entities (principals),
and shares a long-term secret key with each of them, namely, S shares KSA
and KSB with A and B respectively. The term KAB denotes a session key. The
notation {. . . }AB stands for a ciphertext computed using a key KAB.
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The ﬁrst message is a request from A to the TTP that A wishes to establish
a key with B, by sending its identity, the identity of the peer entity and a
nonce. On receiving the request the TTP generates a random session key KAB.
The TTP replies with a message encrypted with A’s long-term key, KSA. This
message includes a session key KAB, and another encrypted message containing
the same session key but encrypted with B’s long term key, which A sends to B
in the next step.
When B receives the message, it decrypts it using KSB, then veriﬁes that
it contains B’s identity, and if successful, then B considers KAB as a valid
session key. To verify the freshness of the session key, B sends a nonce, NB, to A
encrypted using the session key. On receiving the message in Step 4, A decrypts
it and sends NB − 1 to B encrypted using the same session key. This completes
the protocol. If both parties terminate without generating any error then A and
B assume that KAB is a valid session key for the subsequent communication.
As per the standard cryptographic assumption, the initializing vectors (iv)
in CBC and CFB modes are public values. We assume that the attacker is an
insider, i.e., I is a legitimate network entity and shared KSI with the TTP. An
attacker I in the role of A is denoted by I(A).
For the simplicity of exposition, we assume that each term of the proto-
col is encoded in a separate block, e.g., the implementation of {N1, N2}AB
using CBC mode of encryption results in the following ciphertext: iv, c1 =
{N1 ⊕ iv}AB, {N2 ⊕ c1}AB. If blocks are not encoded with this perfect align-
ment then less eﬃcient versions of the reported attacks may exist that require
more computation and communication on the part of the adversary2. Neverthe-
less, the cryptographic security guarantees [9, 10] are valid independent of the
block alignments in a plaintext.
In the following we describe the attacks against CBC and CFB based imple-
mentations. These attacks are also applicable on the seven-round version of the
NSSK protocol [8], which does not suﬀer from the old-session-key attack [7].
NSSK with CBC Mode of Encryption
The attack is shown in Fig. 1, which consists of three setup phases followed by the
main attack phase. The superscripts in iva, ivb and ivc are labels used to easily
distinguish between initialization vectors in Setup-(a), Setup-(b) and Setup-(c)
respectively; a subscript, such as ‘1’ in iv1, is used to distinguish diﬀerent values
of initialization vectors. The notation ‘=’ is used to introduce intermediate terms
to simplify the description of the attack.
In Setup-(a), I obtains the term {iva2 ⊕K1}SB, which he sends as a nonce in
Setup-(b) to obtain cb1. In Setup-(c), I obtains the term cc1 by sending K1 as a
nonce; K1 can be computed by I in Setup-(a).
2 For instance, in an attack on IPsec [5] that is based on address rewriting, the ﬁrst
phase of the attack succeeds with a probability of 2−17, due to a speciﬁc block
alignment of IPsec. This means that an attacker may have to repeat the ﬁrst phase
217 times in order to succeed.
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Messages
Setup-(a)
(1) I −→ S : I, B,NI
(2) S −→ I : iva1 , iva2 , ca1 = {iva1 ⊕ NI}SI , ca2 = {ca1 ⊕ B}SI , ca3 = {ca2 ⊕ K1}SI , ca4 ={ca3 ⊕ {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB}SI , ca5 = {ca4 ⊕ {{iva2 ⊕ K1}SB ⊕ I}SB}SI
Setup-(b)
(1) I(A) −→ S : A,B, {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB
(2) S −→ I(A) : ivb1, ivb2, cb1 = {ivb1 ⊕{iva2 ⊕K1}SB}SA, cb2 = {cb1 ⊕B}SA, cb3 = {cb2 ⊕K2}SA,
cb4 = {cb3 ⊕ {ivb2 ⊕ K2}SB}SA, cb5 = {cb4 ⊕ {{ivb2 ⊕ K2}SB ⊕ A}SB}SA
Setup-(c)
(1) I(A) −→ S : A,B,K1
(2) S −→ A : ivc1, ivc2, cc1 = {ivc1 ⊕ K1}SA, cc2 = {cc1 ⊕ B}SA, cc3 = {cc2 ⊕ K3}SA, cc4 ={cc3 ⊕ {ivc2 ⊕ K3}SB}SA, cc5 = {cc4 ⊕ {{ivc2 ⊕ K3}SB ⊕ A}SB}SA
Attack
(1) A −→ S : A,B,NA
(2a) S −→ I(A) : iv1, iv2, c1 = {iv1 ⊕ NA}SA, c2 = {c1 ⊕ B}SA, c3 = {c2 ⊕ K4}SA, c4 =
{c3 ⊕ {iv2 ⊕ K4}SB}SA, c5 = {c4 ⊕ {{iv2 ⊕ K4}SB ⊕ A}SB}SA
(2b) I(S) −→ A : iv1, iv2, c1 = {iv1 ⊕ NA}SA, c2 = {c1 ⊕ B}SA, cc1 = {ivc1 ⊕ K1}SA, cb1 =
{ivb1 ⊕ {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB}SA, cb1 = {ivb1 ⊕ {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB}SA
(3a) A −→ I(B) : cc1 ⊕ ivb1 ⊕ {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB , cb1 ⊕ ivb1 ⊕ {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB
(3b) I(A′ = c6 ⊕ iva2 ⊕ K1) −→ B : iva2 , c6 = {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB , {iva2 ⊕ K1}SB
(4a) B −→ I(A′) : {NB}K1
(4b) I(B) −→ A : {NB}c2⊕ivc1⊕K1
(5a) A −→ I(B) : {NB − 1}c2⊕ivc1⊕K1
(5b) I(A′) −→ B : {NB − 1}K1
Fig. 1. Attack on CBC-version of NSSK Protocol
Messages
Attack
(1) A −→ S : A,B,NA
(2a) S −→ I(A) : iv1, iv2, c1 = {iv1}SA ⊕ NA, c2 = {c1}SA ⊕ B, c3 = {c2}SA ⊕ K4, c4 =
{c3}SA ⊕ {iv2}SB ⊕ K4, c5 = {c4}SA ⊕ {{iv2}SB ⊕ K4}SB ⊕ A
(2b) I(S) −→ A : iv1, iv2, c1 = {iv1}SA ⊕ NA, c2 = {c1}SA ⊕ B,R1, c2 = {c1}SA ⊕ B,R2
(3) A −→ I(B) : iv2, {R1}SA ⊕ c2, {c2}SA ⊕ R2
(4) I(B) −→ A : iv4, {iv4}K′
1
⊕ NI , where K′1 = {c2}SA ⊕ R1
(5) A −→ I(B) : iv5, {iv5}K′
1
⊕ (NI − 1)
Fig. 2. Attack on CFB-version of NSSK Protocol
In the main phase of the attack, I replays the two terms, cb1 and cc1, in place
of c3 and c4 in the step (2b). This completes the attack on A, i.e., I can know
impersonate as B to A with a known session key c2 ⊕ ivc1 ⊕K1.
The attack can be further extended to B if c6⊕iva2⊕K1 represents some valid
identity. If this is the case then, in the step (3b), I replays iva2 , {iva2 ⊕K1}SB,
which he obtains in Setup-(a). In this way B believes in K1 as a new session
key shared with a party whose identity is c6 ⊕ iva2 ⊕ K1. At this stage, I has
successfully deceived both A and B into accepting the session keys that he knows.
There are two diﬀerent session keys, namely, A’s session key is c2⊕ ivc1⊕K1 and
B’s session key is K1. Now, I can play a man-in-middle role in any subsequent
communication.
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NSSK with CFB Mode of Encryption
In the attack on CFB version of the protocol, I is able to impersonate as B
to A. In the step (2a), an adversary I intercepts the server’s reply to A. The
adversary replaces the terms c3, c4, and c5 of the step (2a) with R1, c2, and R2
and sends the resultant message to A in the step (2b); here R1 and R2 are any
adversary’s generated values.
When A receives the message in the step (2b), it decrypts R1 to obtain a
session key, which results in the value K ′1 = {c2}SA ⊕ R1. Although the term
{c2}SA is not known to I at this stage, I can obtain {c2}SA in the step 3, in
which the term {c2}SA ⊕R2 occurs in its second half. As R2 is known to I, the
session key K ′1 can be derived.
4 DSSK Protocol
Denning and Sacco [7] improves the NSSK protocol using time-stamps. The
modiﬁed protocol is as follows:
(1) A −→ S : A,B
(2) S −→ A : {B,KAB, T, {A,KAB, T }SB}SA
(3) A −→ B : {A,KAB, T }SB
The protocols works essentially in the same way as the NSSK protocol. The new
term T represents a time-stamp, and it is assumed that the local clocks of all
network parties are loosely synchronized.
DSSK with CBC Mode of Encryption
This attack is listed in Fig 3, in which the adversary succeeds in impersonating
B to A, i.e, at the end of the attack I in the role of B has a shared key with A.
In the setup phase, I sends a request to S for establishing a connection with A,
and as a result, I receives the terms c¯a5 and c¯a6 , which are later used in the main
phase of the attack.
In the main phase of the attack, I intercepts the reply from S and replace c2
and c3 with c¯
a
5 and c¯
a
6 respectively. Consequently, the last three messages will
decrypt to some random data when A later sends them to B, however, I can
pretend to be B. The session key for A and I(B) is K1 ⊕ c¯a4 ⊕ c1. Clearly, this
term is computable by I because K1, c¯a4 and c1 are known to I.
The term c¯a6 is decrypted to T1. The Setup phase of the attack needs to
be in real-time (in a loose sense) so that the diﬀerence between T1 and T2 is
tolerable. As per the authors of the protocol, the deﬁnition of real-time is quite
relaxed, namely a delay up to t1 +t2 is tolerable, where t1 is the interval
representing normal time-shift between A’s local clock and the server clock, and
t2 is the expected network delay. This value is typically equal to a few seconds
for most of the networks, such as the Internet.
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Messages
Setup
(1) I −→ S : I, A
(2) S −→ I : iva1 , iva2 , ca1 = {A ⊕ iva1 }SI , ca2 = {K1 ⊕ ca1}SI , ca3 = {T1 ⊕ ca2}SI , ca4 = {(c¯a4 ={I ⊕ iva2 }SA)⊕ ca3}SI , ca5 = {(c¯a5 = {K1 ⊕ c¯a4}SA)⊕ ca4}SI , ca6 = {(c¯a6 = {T1 ⊕ c¯a5}SA)⊕
ca5}SI
Attack
(1) A −→ S : A,B
(2a) S −→ I(A) : iv1, iv2, c1 = {B ⊕ iv1}SA, c2 = {K2 ⊕ c1}SA, c3 = {T2 ⊕ c2}SA, c4 =
{{A⊕ iv2}SB ⊕ c3}SA, c5 = {{K2 ⊕ {A⊕ iv2}SB}SB ⊕ c4}SA, c6 = {{T2 ⊕ {K2 ⊕ {A ⊕
iv2}SB}SB}SB ⊕ c5}SA
(2b) I(S) −→ A : iv1, iv2, c1 = {B ⊕ iv1}SA, c¯a5 , c¯a6 , c4, c5, c6
(3) A −→ I(B) : random data
Fig. 3. Attack on CBC-version of DSSK Protocol
Messages
Setup
(1) I −→ S : I, A
(2) S −→ I : iva1 , iva2 , ca1 = {iva1 }SI ⊕A, ca2 = {ca1}SI ⊕K1, ca3 = {ca2}SI ⊕T1, ca4 = {ca3}SI ⊕
(c¯a4 = {iva2 }SA⊕I), ca5 = {ca4}SI⊕(c¯a5 = {c¯a4}SA⊕K1), ca6 = {ca5}SI⊕(c¯a6 = {c¯a5}SA⊕T1)
Attack
(1) A −→ S : A,B
(2a) S −→ I(A) : iv1, iv2, c1 = {iv1}SA ⊕ B, c2 = {c1}SA ⊕ K2, c3 = {c2}SA ⊕ T2, c4 =
{c3}SA⊕{iv2}SB⊕A, c5 = {c4}SA⊕{{iv2}SB⊕A}SB ⊕K2, c6 = {c5}SA⊕{{{iv2}SB ⊕
A}SB ⊕ K2}SB ⊕ T2
(2b) I(S) −→ A : iv1, iv2, c1 = {iv1}SA ⊕ B, c¯a5 , c¯a6 , c1, R1, R2
(3) A −→ I(B) : iv2, {c¯a6}SA ⊕ c1, {c1}SA ⊕ R1, {R1}SA ⊕ R2
Fig. 4. Attack on CFB-version of DSSK Protocol
DSSK with CFB Mode of Encryption
This attack is similar to the attack on the CBC version. The adversary I obtains
the terms c¯a5 and c¯
a
6 in the setup phase. In the main phase, I intercepts the reply
from the server in the step (2a) and replaces the terms c2, c3, c4, c5, and c6 with
c¯a5 , c¯
a
6 , c1, R1, and R2 respectively; here, R1 and R2 are any values known to I.
When A receives the modiﬁed message in the step (2b), the session key is
computed to be {c1}SA⊕ c¯a5 . The term {c1}SA is not known to I; that is why c4
and c5 of the step (2a) were replaced by c1 and R1. The decryption of c1 and R1
results in {c¯a6}SA ⊕ c1 and {c1}SA ⊕ R1, which A sends supposedly to B in the
step (3). In this way, I can derive the term {c1}SA. The decryption of c¯a6 results
in T1, which is a valid time-stamp based on the same arguments presented for
the CBC version.
5 Private-Key Symbolic Encryption Schemes
The reported attacks cannot be produced in a security model in which encryp-
tion is speciﬁed as one monolithic ciphertext, which hides the structure of a
ciphertext. On the other hand, a ciphertext resulting from a block-cipher based
encryption scheme always has a semantic structure.
We propose that symbolic encryption should be speciﬁed using the abstraction
of a block-cipher, because the output of a block cipher can be safely assumed as
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a monolithic ciphertext. Further, a block cipher is the most natural abstraction
of actual implementation and can be instantiated, e.g., with an appropriate
algorithm from Advance Encryption Standard (AES).
In a formal security model that supports the Xor operator, it is quite straight
forward to specify commonly used cryptographic encryption schemes, such as
CBC and CFB. In our proposal, however, we do not assume that the support
for the Xor operator is available. The motivation of this exclusion is contempo-
rary and based on the observation that properly incorporating the Xor operator
in formal security models is a long-standing open problem [21, 22]. The Xor
operator is not supported by most of the veriﬁcation tools, e.g., OFMC [11],
LySa [12], and Spi-calculus [30]. On the other hand, the proposed Xor-free en-
cryption schemes can be seamlessly used in existing formal security models.
Our assumptions are as follows. We consider a block-cipher as a family of
pseudo random permutations (PRP) [31]. We consider three types of adver-
saries that are computationally bounded in a sense that their attacks strate-
gies terminate in a polynomial time. The three types are passive adversary,
CPA-adversary (i.e, an adversary who can access an encryption oracle), and
CPA/CCA-adversary (i.e., an adversary who can access both encryption and
decryption oracles.)
A few notations used in the following sections are as follows. An overline on
a variable name, such as M1, indicates that the variable is on binary strings.
We use the the notation Us to represent the uniform distribution on strings of
size s. The notation Us is used to represent a random variable on the uniform
distribution: Us ← Us. The concatenation of random variables U1s, . . . , U
n
s is just
another random variable Uns, where Uns ← Uns. The notation dist[.] represents
the probability distribution of its argument, e.g., dist[U
1
s] is Us.
In the following, we deﬁne a minimal symbolic encryption system.
Definition 1 (Symbolic Encryption System). On the set of all base terms
V, with a security parameter s = log2(|V|), we define a private-key symbolic
encryption system as follows.
– M ::= M, M | V | {M}K | {C}−1K
– V ::= x ∈ V
– K ::= M (Syntactic sugar to indicate that the term K is being used as a key)
– C ::= {M}K (Syntactic sugar to indicate that the term is a ciphertext)
– Cancellation Rule : M = {{M}K}−1K = {{M}−1K }K
– Encryption Rule : Given K and M , {M}K can be derived.
– Decryption Rule : Given K and C, {C}−1K can be derived.
Here M, K, C and V are the formal expression; while M , K and C are the corre-
sponding meta-variables.
To deﬁne the semantics of the symbolic encryption system, we use the notion of
variadic ciphers [32], which can take binary strings of diﬀerent lengths as inputs.
The reason for employing a variadic cipher is based on the fact that M in Def. 1
consists of a variable number of base terms. To model the arbitrary size of a key
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(K in Def. 1), we extend the notion of a variadic cipher to an idealized variadic
cipher (IVC), namely a family of functions that contains an inﬁnite number of
variadic functions. We represent the i-th idealized variadic cipher as Πi(.).
The notion of an IVC can be compared to a traditional cipher, which is mod-
elled as a family containing a ﬁxed number of PRPs (pseudo random permuta-
tions) and all of the PRPs are of the same size, e.g., AES with 256 bit key is a
family containing 2256 PRPs of size 128 bit. Note, however, that the use of IVCs
is just for a simpler exposition. Later, we deﬁne our symbolic schemes in such a
way that only the restricted forms of IVCs occur that can be instantiated with
traditional ciphers.
Definition 2 (Cryptographic Semantics). The cryptographic semantics of
the symbolic encryption system in Def. 1 are as follows.
– V
def
= V ∈ {0, 1}s (Each base term is encoded as a bit string of a fixed length
s, such that s = log2(|V|))
– M1,M2
def
= M1,M2 (Concatenation of two bit strings)
– {M}K def= {M}K = ΠK(M),
where ΠK(M) is the Kth cipher in a family of IVCs.
– {C}−1K def= {C}−1K , such that C = ΠK({C}−1K ).
Definition 3 (Security). We define the following three security properties,
assuming that K is not known to the adversary.
WP-security (Weak Privacy Against Passive Attack)
def
= It is infeasible for
a passive adversary I to compute C for a known M , s.t., C = {M}K. Further,
it is also infeasible for I to compute M for a known C, s.t., M = {C}−1K .
NM-security (Non-malleability Against CPA/CCA)
def
= It is infeasible for a
CPA/CCA-adversary to compute C′ for a known C, s.t., a pre-specified relation
R(M,M ′) holds3, where M = {C}−1K and M ′ = {C′}−1K .
IND-security (Indistinguishability Against CPA)
def
= It is infeasible for a
CPA-adversary to distinguish between the probability distributions dist[{M}K ]
and Ul, for all values of M , where l = |{M}K |. 4
Clearly, WP-security is implied by IND-security, because if an adversary can
recover the plaintext from a ciphertext then he can always distinguish between
the ciphertext and a random bit string. In our proofs, we also use the fact that if
an encryption function is deterministic then it cannot be IND-secure [13]. Note
that IND-security and NM-security are not comparable in our model, because we
use the abstraction of a cipher, which is a deterministic encryption algorithm for
a ﬁxed key. As shown by Katz and Yung [2], for probabilistic encryption, there
are well-deﬁned relations between NM-security and IND-security under diﬀerent
attack models.
3 E.g., M = M1,M2 and M
′
= M2,M1
4 Equivalently, I can only succeeds in the indistinguishability experiment (IND-P2-
C0) [2] with a negligible probability.
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Claim 1 (Soundness of Symbolic Encryption System). The symbolic en-
cryption function {M}K is WP,NM-secure if a CPA/CCA-adversary cannot
derive K.
Proof (Sketch). As per the semantics, {M}K is a PRP corresponding toΠK(M).
For a secretK, mapping fromM to ΠK(M) is secret, which implies weak privacy
for a polynomial-time adversary. The mapping from an input to the output is
random, which implies non-malleability. The formal proof is trivial (but tedious)
and is left out. unionsq
In the following, we introduce four symbolic encryption schemes. The direct
implementations of these schemes, as per the semantics, assume the existence of
one of the two ciphers corresponding to the key size s and 2s, e.g., AES-128 and
AES-256.
Definition 4 (Symbolic Encryption Schemes). Let M and K be the two
variable of symbolic encryption system with semantics M and K, such that
|M | ≤ sc and |K| = s, for a constant c. Let M1, . . . ,MN be the parsing of M ,
such that |Mi| = s, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . ECB symbolic encryption (ECB-SE), bulk
symbolic encryption (BLK-SE), randomized symbolic encryption (RND-SE), and
randomized-bulk symbolic encryption (RNB-SE), are defined by the ECB-rule,
BLK-rule, RND-rule, and RNB-rule respectively.
ECB-rule:
{M}K
{M1}K , ..., {Mi}K , ..., {MN}K
BLK-rule:
{M}K
{M1, ...,Mi, ...,MN}K
RND-rule:
{M}K
V1, {M1}K,V1 , ..., Vi, {Mi}K,Vi , ..., VN , {MN}K,VN
RNB-rule:
{M}K
V1, {M1, ...,Mi, ...,MN}K,V1
In the above deﬁnition, sc stands for a polynomial in s; without a polynomial
length restriction, none of the existing cryptographic encryption schemes is se-
cure. In the above rules, the base terms V1, ..., VN appear as free variables, there-
fore these variables are assumed to be instantiated with unique values in each
instance of a protocol. Also note that, e.g., the key used to create ciphertext
{M1, ...,Mi, ...,MN}K,V1 is K,V1, which semantically corresponds to the con-
catenation of K and V1. The main motivation for the above division is their
correspondence to some of the existing cryptographic schemes, as described in
the following sections.
6 Security Analysis
In the following, we analyse these schemes for the security properties in Def. 3.
Claim 2. The ECB-SE is WP-secure, but it is neither NM-secure nor IND-
secure.
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Proof. Each encrypted term {Mi}K in the ECB scheme is a PRP and is WP,NM-
secure (Claim 1). From WP,NM-security of the terms, we derive the security
properties of the whole scheme.
It is clear that the WP-security of the scheme can be reduced to the WP-
security of its terms, because if a passive adversary can recover the plaintext
M1, . . . ,MN then he can invert a PRP on N diﬀerent values. The same obser-
vation holds for deriving ciphertexts from plaintexts.
The scheme is not IND-secure because it is a deterministic function [13].
The ECB scheme is not NM-secure due to a simple attack. In the attack, an
adversary permutes the individual encrypted terms. For example, given a ci-
phertext {M1}K , {M2}K , the adversary can produce another valid ciphertext
{M2}K , {M1}K that has a related plaintext to the plaintext of the ﬁrst cipher-
text. This completes the proof. unionsq
Claim 3. The output distribution of RND-SE is UNs.
Proof. The size of each i-th term in a ciphertext of RND-SE is |{Mi}K,Vi | = s,
as per Def. 4. Therefore, the number of plausible ciphertexts for the i-th term
is 2s. In each term, Vi is used as part of the key. Being Vi a free variable,
each application of RND-rule uses a new value. With a secret K, there are 2s
equally probable values for the key K,V i, in every application of the RNB-rule.
Consequently, the output of ΠK,V i(M) is evenly distributed on 2
s plausible
ciphertexts for a known value of M .
Therefore, we have U is = {Mi}K,Vi where dist[U is] = Us, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The
distribution of complete ciphertext is dist[U1s , . . . , U
N
s ] = UNs. unionsq
Claim 4. The RND-SE is WP,IND-secure, but it is not NM-secure.
Proof. The RND-SE is clearly not NM-secure, because the same permutation
attack of Claim 2 also works for the RND-SE. Since WP-security is implied
by IND-security, we only need to prove that RND-SE is IND-secure. For IND-
security, a CPA-adversary cannot distinguish between a ciphertext corresponding
to the adversary’s plaintext and a random string UNs, where UNs ← UNs. From
Claim 3, the output distribution of RND-SE is UNs, which is same as that of the
random bit string. Hence, RND-SE is WP,IND-secure but is not NM-secure. unionsq
Claim 5. The BLK-SE is WP,NM-secure, but it is not IND-secure.
Proof. This scheme represents one variadic PRP and is therefore WP,NM-secure
(Claim 1). The scheme is deterministic, therefore it cannot be IND-secure [13].
unionsq
Claim 6. The scheme RNB-SE is WP,IND,NM-secure.
The ciphertext of the scheme is also a single variadic PRP and is therefore
WP,NM-secure. To show that it is IND-secure, similar to Claim 4, the proba-
bility distribution of a ciphertext corresponding to a known plaintext must be
computationally indistinguishable from a random bit string for a CPA-adversary.
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The size of the ciphertext in RNB-SE is Ns, therefore the domain correspond-
ing to plausible ciphertexts is of size 2Ns. Since the term V is assigned a new
value on each application of RNB-rule, there are 2s uniformly distributed values
for the key K,V . Consequently, there are 2s uniformly distributed values for the
ciphertext.
To violate IND-security, a CPA-adversary is required to distinguish between
the following two distributions: the uniform distribution on 2s strings each of size
Ns (corresponding to the ciphertext); and the uniform distribution UNs (corre-
sponding to a random string.) The most eﬃcient known technique to distinguish
between two uniform distributions is to compare the number of collisions in the
lists of values drawn from the respective distributions.
From the birthday problem, we know that in a list of q ciphertexts computed
from the same plaintext, an upper bound on the probability of any collision is
0.5q(q − 1)2−s, and for random strings drawn from UNs a lower bound on the
probability of any collision is 0.3q(q−1)2−Ns. Although the maximum diﬀerence
between the probabilities of collisions, namely 0.5q(q− 1)2−s− 0.3q(q− 1)2−Ns,
is relatively large, but the diﬀerence is only noticeable if an adversary is able to
generate at least one collision.
Since 0.5q(q − 1)2−s > 0.3q(q − 1)2−Ns and 0.5q(q − 1)2−s is negligible in s
assuming q is polynomial in s, the probability of occurrence of a collision is neg-
ligible. For a polynomial-time adversary, q must be a polynomial in s. Therefore,
we conclude that adversary cannot distinguish between the two distributions.
Hence, RNB-SE is IND,NM,WP-secure. unionsq
The results presented in this section are listed in Table 1. In all of the encryp-
tion schemes in Def. 4 the key size is ﬁxed: it is s for ECB-SE and BLK-SE,
and it is 2s for RND-SE and RNB-SE. Further, for ECB-SE and RND-SE, the
block size is also ﬁxed. This means that ECB-SE and RND-SE can be imple-
mented with traditional block ciphers, and BLK-SE and RNB-SE schemes can
be implemented with variadic ciphers [32]. Besides such semantic-oriented imple-
mentations, other cryptographic algorithms can be chosen for an implementation
using the security properties (Claim 2-6) of each scheme.
We know that a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) can be
used to provide the non-malleability of a plaintext under encrypt-then-MAC
method (i.e., MAC of ciphertext) [33]. Further note that CBC/CFB mode of
encryption provide IND-security under CPA [9, 10].
Therefore, e.g., ECB-SE can be implemented using AES in ECB mode of
encryption; RND-SE can be implemented using AES in CBCmode of encryption;
BLK-SE can be implemented using AES in ECB mode along with a message
authentication code (MAC); and RNB-SE can be implemented using AES in
CBC mode along with a MAC. It is certainly possible (perhaps after extending
the system of Def. 1) to deﬁne symbolic schemes that correspond to other forms
of cryptographic encryption, such as the counter mode of encryption.
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7 Discussion
In practice, it is nonetheless dangerous to assume that a system developer will
actually discover and use the correct cryptographic scheme that meets the secu-
rity requirements of a particular use of symbolic encryption. System developers
often use an implementation instance that seems appropriate, e.g., in this paper,
the CBC implementations of encryption in NSSK and DSKK protocols indeed
guarantee privacy in a strong sense [13]; however, non-malleability of the cipher-
texts, an implicit assumption, is also required for the security of these protocols.
One may always choose to employ a strong encryption scheme meeting the
requirements of RNB-SE however, the cost associated with such an overly cau-
tious approach cannot be ignored in practice. For example, if the symbolic model
of a protocol that uses ECB-SE is secure then this means that the protocol can
be implemented in a relatively eﬃcient manner: a random number generator
is not required; the algorithm for message authentication code (MAC, used to
guarantee non-malleability) is not required; and communication bandwidth is
reduced because we do not need to transmit initialization vectors and MAC
codes. Moreover, parallelisation of the encryption process is straight forward.
In many applications, such optimizations can make a huge diﬀerence, e.g., for
a hypervisor which has to process millions of requests per second, and a sensor
node in which memory, computational power and energy are scarce resources.
Many symbolic protocols remain secure when encryption requirements are met
by a weaker symbolic encryption scheme, such as ECB-SE and CBC mode of
encryption; in this way a level of safe optimization can be achieved.
It is important to remember that safely instantiating a symbolic encryption
scheme with a cryptographic encryption scheme does not mean that the resul-
tant protocol will be secure, because there are many attacks that do not rely on
encryption, e.g., Lowe’s attack [34] on public-key version of Needham-Schroeder
protocol relies on the assumption of a corrupt insider, Denning-Sacco’s attack [7]
relies on the availability of a compromised old session key. Moreover, there are
many security vulnerabilities that are outside the realm of (mathematical) cryp-
tography, e.g., buﬀer-overﬂow.
Table 1. Summary of Results
Scheme WP IND NM Instantiation Examples
ECB-SE
√ × × AES-128 in ECB mode of encryption
BLK-SE
√ × √ (1) AES-128 in ECB mode of encryption with SHA-256
as MAC (2) Variadic cipher
RND-SE
√ √ × (1,2) AES-128 in CBC/CFB mode of encryption
RNB-SE
√ √ √
(1,2) AES-128 in CBC/CFB mode of encryption with
SHA-256 as MAC (3) Variadic cipher with a randomized
key
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we reported new attacks on reasonable implementations of well-
known protocols. It appears that there is no inherent limitation in symbolic mod-
els which may have prevented detecting these attacks. We notice that encryption
on multiple terms is traditionally speciﬁed as one big monolithic encrypted block,
which, however, is not a good way of specifying it for practice-oriented security
analysis. We presented four reﬁned ways in which encryption can be speciﬁed
in a symbolic model. The proposed speciﬁcations not only help to avoid many
implementation vulnerabilities similar to the reported attacks, but they also pro-
vide a degree of safe optimization. We hope that our work will bring symbolic
encryption closer to the secure implementation of encryption.
References
1. Dworkin, M.: Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation. methods and
techniques. Technical report, DTIC Document (2001)
2. Katz, J., Yung, M.: Complete characterization of security notions for probabilistic
private-key encryption. In: Theory of Computing. ACM (2000)
3. Dolev, D., Yao, A.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Trans. on Infor-
mation Theory (1983)
4. Bellovin, S.: Problem areas for the IP security protocols. In: USENIX UNIX Secu-
rity Symp. (1996)
5. Paterson, K.G., Yau, A.K.L.: Cryptography in Theory and Practice: The Case of
Encryption in IPsec. In: Vaudenay, S. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2006. LNCS, vol. 4004,
pp. 12–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
6. Needham, R., Schroeder, M.: Using encryption for authentication in large networks
of computers. Communications of the ACM 21(12), 993–999 (1978)
7. Denning, D., Sacco, G.: Timestamps in key distribution protocols. Communications
of the ACM 24(8), 533–536 (1981)
8. Needham, R., Schroeder, M.: Authentication revisited. Operating Systems Review
21(1) (1987)
9. Goldwasser, S., Bellare, M.: Lecture notes on cryptography. Course “Cryptography
and computer security” at MIT 1999 (1996) 1999
10. Fouque, P.-A., Martinet, G., Poupard, G.: Practical Symmetric On-Line Encryp-
tion. In: Johansson, T. (ed.) FSE 2003. LNCS, vol. 2887, pp. 362–375. Springer,
Heidelberg (2003)
11. Basin, D., Mo¨dersheim, S., Vigano, L.: Ofmc: A symbolic model checker for security
protocols. International Journal of Information Security 4(3), 181–208 (2005)
12. Bodei, C., Buchholtz, M., Degano, P., Nielson, F., Nielson, H.: Static validation of
security protocols. Journal of Computer Security 13(3), 347–390 (2005)
13. Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Probabilistic encryption. J. of Computer and System
Sciences 28(2) (1984)
14. Meadows, C.: Formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis: Emerging issues
and trends. Selected Areas in Communications 21(1), 44–54 (2003)
15. Moore, J.: Protocol failures in cryptosystems. Proc. of the IEEE 76(5), 594–602
(1988)
16. Boyd, C.: Hidden assumptions in cryptographic protocols. In: Proc. of Computers
and Digital Techniques, vol. 137, pp. 433–436. IET (1990)
572 N. Ahmed, C.D. Jensen, and E. Zenner
17. Mao, W., Boyd, C.: On the use of encryption in cryptographic protocols. In: Codes
and Cyphers (1995)
18. Stubblebine, S., Meadows, C.: Formal characterization and automated analysis of
known-pair and chosen-text attacks. IEEE J. on Selected Areas in Communica-
tions 18(4), 571–581 (2000)
19. Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Analysing the vulnerability of protocols to produce known-
pair and chosen-text attacks. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Sci-
ence 128(5), 87–104 (2005)
20. Degabriele, J., Paterson, K.: Attacking the IPsec standards in encryption-only
conﬁgurations. In: IEEE Symp. S&P, pp. 335–349. IEEE (2007)
21. Chevalier, Y., Kusters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: An NP decision proce-
dure for protocol insecurity with XOR. In: Logic in CS. IEEE (2003)
22. Ku¨sters, R., Truderung, T.: Reducing protocol analysis with xor to the xor-free
case in the horn theory based approach. In: Proc. of CCS. ACM (2008)
23. Lowe, G.: A family of attacks upon authentication protocols. Technical Report
1997/5, University of Leicester (1997)
24. Chevalier, Y., Vigneron, L.: Automated Unbounded Veriﬁcation of Security Pro-
tocols. In: Brinksma, E., Larsen, K.G. (eds.) CAV 2002. LNCS, vol. 2404, pp.
125–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
25. Abadi, M., Rogaway, P.: Reconciling two views of cryptography. In: TCS: Exploring
New Frontiers of Theoretical Informatics, pp. 3–22 (2000)
26. Herzog, J.C., Liskov, M., Micali, S.: Plaintext Awareness via Key Registration. In:
Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 548–564. Springer, Heidel-
berg (2003)
27. Micciancio, D., Warinschi, B.: Soundness of Formal Encryption in the Presence of
Active Adversaries. In: Naor, M. (ed.) TCC 2004. LNCS, vol. 2951, pp. 133–151.
Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
28. Canetti, R., Herzog, J.: Universally composable symbolic security analysis. J. of
Cryptology (2011)
29. Bellare, M., Boldyreva, A., Knudsen, L.R., Namprempre, C.: Online Ciphers and
the Hash-CBC Construction. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139,
pp. 292–309. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
30. Abadi, M., Gordon, A.D.: Reasoning About Cryptographic Protocols in the Spi
Calculus. In: Mazurkiewicz, A., Winkowski, J. (eds.) CONCUR 1997. LNCS,
vol. 1243, pp. 59–73. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
31. Luby, M., Rackoﬀ, C.: How to Construct Pseudo-random Permutations from
Pseudo-random Functions. In: Williams, H.C. (ed.) CRYPTO 1985. LNCS,
vol. 218, pp. 447–447. Springer, Heidelberg (1986)
32. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: On the Construction of Variable-Input-Length Ciphers.
In: Knudsen, L.R. (ed.) FSE 1999. LNCS, vol. 1636, pp. 231–244. Springer, Hei-
delberg (1999)
33. Bellare, M., Namprempre, C.: Authenticated Encryption: Relations among No-
tions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.)
ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 531–545. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
34. Lowe, G.: Breaking and ﬁxing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using
FDR. Tools and Algos. for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (1996)
